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I. STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Introduction.

Idaho County made a request for proposals (RFP) for a solid waste collection contract in
the fall of 2012. Proposals were to be made by October 12, 2012, and would be opened at a public
meeting on October 15, 2012.
Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. ("Simmons") responded to Idaho County's RFP.
Appellant, Walco, Inc. ("Walco"), was the other responder. Simmons had for many years provided
solid waste services in the eastern portion of Idaho County. Walco had provided similar services
in the western portion of the County and along the Salmon River.
Both proposals were opened in a public hearing on October 15, 2012. Walco, in Simmons'
absence, discussed its proposal in detail at the first public hearing on October 15, 2012. Simmons
and Walco participated in a series of subsequent public meetings held by the Idaho County
Commissioners. Walco and Simmons openly discussed and argued the relative merits of the
competing proposals to the Idaho County Commissioners in detail over the course of these
meetings.
Idaho County awarded the contract to Simmons effective January l, 2013.
Walco subsequently brought suit, asserting that its bid figure was and remained a trade
secret and that Simmons had misappropriated that secret.
The District Court dismissed all of Walco' s claims.

B.

District Court Proceedings.

Walco' s complaint against Simmons was for misappropriation of trade secrets under the
Idaho Trade Secrets Act, Idaho Code§ 48-801 to 807 ("ITSA"). (R Vol. 1, p. 9-65.) Idaho County
moved for summary judgment. (R Vol. 3, pp. 450-89, 552-77.)

Simmons joined in Idaho

County's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R Vol. 3, pp. 511-512.)
In response, Walco filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment (R Vol. 6, pp. 1226-

42).
At the December 20, 2013, hearing on the summary judgment motions, the District Court
indicated it would be granting summary judgment to Idaho County and Simmons. (R Vol. 7, pp.

1723-24.) Before the District Court could reduce its ruling to writing, Walco filed a motion for
reconsideration. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1728-41.) After additional briefing and a hearing, the District
Court granted summary judgment to Idaho County and Simmons on all of Walco's claims. (R
Vol. 8, pp. 1820-36.)
The District Court held that Walco did not, as a matter oflaw, take reasonable measures to
protect the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1820-35.) Walco filed
a timely Notice of Appeal. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1838-43.)
Th.: District Court separately held that Walco's claim against Simmons was bmTed upon
the additional grounds of estoppel since Walco engaged in extensive public discussion of the
specifics of its submission and openly compared it to Simmons' submission and Simmons only
learned ofWalco's proposal after Walco had made the proposal public. (R Vol. 3, pp. 1833-1834.)
Walco did not identify the District Court's holding on this ground as an issue on appeal.
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C.

Appeal.

Walco filed a Notice of Appeal. However, Walco did not identify as an issue on appeal
Judge Stegner's dismissal of the case against Simmons on the grounds of estoppel.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal are as follows:
1.

Since the District Court dismissed the case as against Simmons on the grounds of

estoppel, did Walco's failure to include that issue in its statement of issues pursuant to I.A.R.
35(a)(4), compounded by Walco's failure to address the issue, cite to the record or provide
supporting authority regarding that issue, eliminate consideration of that issue upon appeal?
2.

If Walco has not waived the estoppel issue on appeal, should Walco nonetheless be

estopped from claiming misappropriation by its conduct before, on, and after the 3 p.m. meeting
on October 15, 2012? Since the District Court dismissed the case as against Simmons on the
grounds of estoppel, did Walco' s failure to include that issue in its statement of issues pursuant to
I.A.R. 35(a)(4), compounded by Walco's failure to address the issue, cite to the record or provide
supporting authority regarding that issue, eliminate consideration of that issue upon appeal?
3.

Did Walco fail to prove the existence of a trade secret under the ITSA, either because

its information was readily ascertainable by proper means or because Walco failed to take
reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information? If Wal co has not
waived the estoppel issue on appeal, should Walco nonetheless be estopped from claiming
misappropriation by its conduct before, on, and after the 3 p.m. meeting on October 15, 2012?
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III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
An award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal should be awarded to Simmons pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and IRCP 54.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction.

1.

The Grant of Judgment in Favor of Simmons on the Grounds ofEstoppel Has Not

Been Appealed and, Thus, Should Not be Considered by this Court.
Judge Stegner specifically ruled that Walco was estopped from making a claim against
Simmons. Walco does not identify this as an issue presented on appeal and fails to address the
District Court's ruling on this critical issue in its brief. This is fatal to Walco's appeal. S'ee, Kugler

v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687,809 P.2d 1166 (1991) and Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,292 P.3d
248 (2012).
2.

Walco Had No Trade Secret, At Least After Approximately 3:00 p.m. on October

15, 2012.
Simmons joins in Idaho County's argument and briefing on whether Walco had a trade
secret at all. The County's argument is incorporated herein by reference to avoid duplication. See,
I.A.R. 35(h).
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3.

If the Grant of Judgment in Simmons' Favor is Considered on Appeal, the District

Court Judgment Should be Upheld.
Assuming, arguendo, that Walco's claim against Simmons is properly before this Court on
appeal, the District Court's decision that Walco is estopped from making a claim against Simmons
is grounded on undisputed facts and consistent with applicable law.
Walco, at a public hearing beginning at about 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, put its
proposal to the County into the public domain. Not only was this done without reservation, Walco
continued to argue in favor of its proposal at that hearing and subsequent hearings.
B.

The Grant of Judgment in Favor of Simmons Has Not Been Appealed and, Thus,

Should Not be Considered by this Court.
Judge Stegner's decision in favor of Simmons on the grounds of estoppel should not be
considered by this Court upon appeal since Walco failed to raise that decision as an issue on appeal
or cite to the record or any authority to show that Judge Stegner committed error in that portion of
his decision.
In Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 809 P.2d 1166 (1991 ), the Idaho Appellate Court held
that the failure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues required by I.AR.
35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of that issue on appeal:
Our appellate rules require that
the brief of appellant shall contain: ... (4) ... A list of the
issues presented on appeal, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail.
The statement of the issues should be short and concise, and
should not be repetitious. The issues shall fairly state the
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issues presented for review. The statement of the issues
presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue
fairly comprised therein.
I.A.R. 35(a)(4).
The Kugler court went on to address the consequences of the failure to identify an issue on
appeal:
Failure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues
required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of that issue
on appeal. State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 961, 783 P.2d 298,
300 (1989) (citing.Jensen v. Doherty, IOI Idaho 910,911,623 P.2d
1287, 1288 (1981) and Drake v. Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 736, 672
P.2d 1064, 1066 (Ct.App.1983)).

Id at 691, 1170. See also, Haight v. Dales Used Cars, Inc., 139 Idaho 853, 87 P.3d 962 (2003).
This Court in Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 292 P.3d 248 (2012) further cited to
established Idaho law that the failure to support an argument by citations to the record and
provision of applicable legal authority means that the issue may not be considered on appeal.
First, the court in Bolognese stated the following requirements for compliance of I.A.R.
35(a)(6):
The argument section of the appellant's brief '·shall contain the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues preseGted on
appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes
and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6).

Id. at 866, 257.
Having established the requirements of the rule, the court went on to dete1mine the
consequences of an appellant's failure to do so:
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"We will not consider assignments of error not supported by
argument and authority in the opening brief." Hogg v. Wolske, 142
Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). "A party waives an
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not
just if both are lacking." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923
P.2d 966, 970 (1996).
Id.
An appellant must first identify the error on appeal in its identification of issues upon
appeal. Kugler, supra. That is necessary to preserve the issue, but not enough to do so. The
appellant must also support the argument that the trial court committed error by citation to the
record and authorities. Otherwise, this Court may not consider the assignment of error. Bolognese,
supra.
The reasoning for this rule can also be found in Bolognese:
In addition, ''because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed
error affected a substantial right, the appellant must present some
argument that a substantial right was implicated." Hurtado v. Land
O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415, 420 (2012). "This
Court will not search the record for error. We do not presume error
on appeal; the party alleging error has the burden of showing it in
the record." Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117,
1122 (2004) (citations omitted). Finally, "[t]his Court will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." Clear Springs
Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 812, 252 P.3d 71, 93
(2011).
Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,866,292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012).

If Walco cannot now belatedly raise this issue on appeal, its case against Simmons is
concluded. Judge Stegner's ruling would be that, in effect, even if the claimed information is a
trade secret, Walco is estopped from making any such claim against Simmons.
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If so. this Court should affirm the decision in favor of Simmons and make an appropriate
award of fees and costs in Simmons' favor.
C.

If the Issue of Estoppel Is Properly Raised on Appeal, then the Judgment of the

District Court Should be Affirmed.
There arc two general principles that control whether Walco has a viable claim against
Simmons on these facts.
1.

Walco' s Public Disclosure of the Purported Secret Denies It Any Protected Status.

First, the general rule is that disclosure of a trade secret abandons secrecy. Idaho County
has argued this principle extensively and its authorities and reasoning are included here by
reference to avoid duplication. See, I.AR. 35(h).
Of particular importance is Idaho County's exhaustive citations to the record showing
hours of public meetings over several weeks where Walco not only disclosed every detail of its
proposal but argued that their proposal was superior to that of Simmons. idaho County's citations
to the record are also included herein by reference per I.AR. 35(h).
It is axiomatic that to be and remain a trade secret, the information n1ust be kept secret:
An element of secrecy is of the very essence of a trade secret. .Where
a trade secret is so disclosed that the requisite element of sec_recv~
_destroved, the trade secret loses its protected status. In the following
cases the courts explicitly or impliedly held or recognized that a
general public disclosure of a trade secret hy a party asserting a
protectible interest therein, or pursuant to the authority of such a
party, 1~esults in an abandomnent of the element of secrecy and in a
destruction of trade secret status.
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Disclosure of'Trade secret as Abandonment ofSecrecy, 92 A.L.R.3d 138, Section 3(a). (Emphasis
added.) (Footnote omitted.)

Walco's promiscuous delivery and display of its proposals,

accompanied by arguments for the superiority of its proposals fails this baseline requirement.
Walco cites no authority where one can first disclose a trade secret publicly but later take it back
and reinstate the 'secret' status.
The District Court's decision on this issue should be affirmed as to both Idaho County and
Simmons based on the undisputed record and authorities cited herein.
2.

Even If Walco Can be Seen as Having a Protectable Trade Secret, It is Estopped

from Asserting a Claim Against Simmons.
Walco admits that it allowed disclosure of its purported secret in a public meeting. (R Vol.
8, p. 1786.) Walco also admits that Simmons had no knowledge of this before the public meeting.
(R Vol. 5, pp. 1095-1096.) Based on these undisputed facts, Judge Stegner concluded that the
Walco claim against Simmons should be dismissed.
Judge Stegner's reasoning in dismissing Walco's claim against Simmons is concise and is
not mentioned, much less rebutted, by Walco:
The Restatement also indicates in § 757, comment d, that a
"privilege to disclose or use another's trade secret may arise from
the other's consent or from other conduct on his part by which he is
estopped from complaining." Such is the case here. Walco engaged
in extensive public discussion of the specifics of its submission and
openly compared it to Simmons's submission. This discussion
occurred at meetings that were public. Anyone could attend and
listen to the argument over the merits of each proposal submitted to
the County.
(R Vol. 8, pp. 1833-1834.)

9

Judge Stegner also dealt with the rather confusing theory on Walco's part that the RFP
was actually a competitive bid:
Even under Walco's theory that this process was one for competitive
bids rather than an alternative RFP process, the statutory provisions
governing competitive bids contemplate the opening of bids in the
presence of the public. In the bid processes contained in LC, §§ 672805 and 67-2806, no matter if it is a process for services, or public
works bids, the sealed bids "shall be opened in public at a
designated place and time ... " (emphasis supplied). I.C. §§ 672805(3)(a)(v), 67-2805(3)(b)(ix), 67-2806(2)(e). Consequently,
even if this Court were to grant Walco's motion for summary
judgment and conclude that the County's request for proposals was
in fact a request for bids, it would defeat Walco's claim for
misappropriation of a trade secret because that process must be
public.
The circumstances created by a public bidding process fornish
Idaho County with such a privilege to evaluate, discuss, and use
Walco's submission such that Walco is estopped from asserting a
claim for misappropriation of one's trade secret. As a result,
Walco's trade secret claim does not establish a prima facie case,
since Walco did not make sufficient efforts to maintain
confidentiality, and Walco should be estopped from asserting a
trade secret claim since Idaho County held a privilege to use and
disclose the information submitted by Walco in the way it was
submitted.
(Emphasis original.) (R Vol. 8, pp. 1833-1834.)
Judge Stegner, based on undisputed facts, found that whether the process was an RFP or a
competitive bid (as Walco contends), that Walco agreed to and did, in fact, take part in a very
public process. This prevents them from suing Simmons who did no more than participate in the
same process under the control and direction of the Idaho County Commissioners.
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Judge Stegner's ruling is supported by general principles of estoppel. The law has a
succinct way of expressing a similar and analogous concept in the case of judicial estoppel.
Idaho adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church. 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d
561 (1954). Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then
subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first. A & J Const. Co. v.
Wood, 141 Idaho682,684, 116P.3d 12, 14(2005). Seealso,Heinzev. Bauer, 145Idaho232, 178

P.3d 597 (2007). The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect "the integrity of the judicial
system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the
judicial proceeding." Id. at 685, 116 P.3d at 15 (quoting Robertson Suppzy Inc. v. Nicholls, 131
Idaho 99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct.App.1998)). Broadly accepted, it is intended to prevent
parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system. See, McCallister v. Blackfoot Medical
Center, 154 Idaho 891,303 P.3d 578 (2013).

While judicial estoppel is not directly applicable, the policy underlying that judicial
principal supports the District Court's ruling that Walco cannot so blithely take inconsistent
positions. To attempt to win the contract, Walco made its proposal public. When that approach
failed, they reversed course and attempt to win damages by alleging that the Walco proposal was
actually a secret and remained so even after Walco thrust it into the public domain.
The broader doctrine of estoppel shows that the purpose of the doctrine is to deny rewards
from those who seek advantage by taking inconsistent positions. Equitable estoppel, applicable
by analogy at least, is a means of preventing a party from asse1iing a legal claim or defense that is
contrary or inconsistent with his or her prior action or conduct:
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Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, certain conduct by a party
is viewed as being so offensive that it precludes the party from later
asserting a claim or defense that would otherwise be meritorious; in
other words, it serves to offset the benefit that the offending party
would otherwise derive from the conduct. Equitable estoppel
prevents a party from asserting rights when his or her own conduct
renders that assertion contrary to equity and good conscience.
28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver§ 27. (Footnotes omitted.)
Walco':.; actions fit this pattern by first publicly disclosing its information and subsequently
claiming as secret what Walco had itself disclosed.
Walco, as Judge Stegner properly found, should be estopped from having any claim against
Simmons. To hold otherwise is to reward Walco for " ... playing fast and loose with the legal
system .... '· See, McCallister v. Blaclifbot Medical Center, 154 Idaho 89L 303 P.3d 578 (2013).
D.

Walco is Not the Victim of Unfair Dealing.

Walco's brief is rife with characterizations that are in conflict with the record, and legal
citations that mischaracterize the law, as Idaho County points out very carefully in its brief.
Walco's argument, stripped to the essentials, is that somehow Wa!co was not treated fairly
by Idaho County and that Simmons had some unfair advantage. The facts are otherwise, and belie
Walco's claim that it is somehow the victim here.
Idaho County offered Walco a sole source contract on several occasions, the last being in
August of 2012. (R Vol. 2, pp. 189-209.) Walco refused this opportunity. J\s Walco admitted in
a brief moment of candor, "[H]owever, the parties reached an impasse when Jdaho County
repeatedly insisted that Walco fund the County's unprofitable recycling program."
Appellant's Brie( p. 2.
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See,

Walco admits thereby that Idaho County wanted the contract to include provisions to
support the County's recycling program. Walco refused to accept what the County policy required.
On July 31, 2012, Idaho County and Simmons executed a ten-year renewal contract
effective January 1, 2013, for Simmons' established coverage area. (R Vol. 2, pp. 165-85.) This
contract included a surcharge obligating Simmons to pay, under the terms of the contract, certain
moneys to support the County recycling program.
Even after the Simmons contract was awarded, Idaho County again offered a sole source
contract to Walco for the rest of the county. (R Vol. 2, pp. 189-209.)
Only after Walco refused the repeated offer of a sole source contract, the County chose to
issue its RFP.
As part of the RFP, the County provided, inter alia, a proposed contract. The County's
proposed contract contained three material terms of relevance. First, the County wanted to retain
the right to implement a "recycling surcharge" by which the contractor might in the future rebate
the County (on a per-ton basis) for any reduction in collected waste resulting from the removal of
recyclable materials from the solid waste stream. (R Vol. 2, pp. 229--30 §§ 11.2, 11.3.) Second,
the County intended to continue to allow for annual base rate increases based on changes to the
Consumer Price Index. (R Vol. 2, p. 226 § 7.1.) Third, the County was willing to continue paying
the fuel surcharge agreed to in 2008, provided that the County would, in turn, continue to receive
a fuel credit for decreases to fuel prices. (R Vol. 2, p. 227 § 7.2.)
Walco responded to the RFP with a 33 page proposal and included a contract that differed
materially from the County's proposed contract. (R Vol. 1, pp. 28-63.) In particular:
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1.

Walco disregarded the County's policy of a recycling surcharge provision;

2.

Walco discarded the historic annual base rate adjustment to CPI and

replaced it with an annual, invariable, compounding 5% increase.
3.

Walco discarded the fuel surcharge provision in the County proposed

contract (which allowed for a decrease if fuel prices declined) in favor of a flat 5% per
year, compounded, increase in the base price.
3.

Walco proposed an initial base price of $87,000 per month for Walco. (R

Vol. 2, pp. 242, 244-71.)
A comparison to the Simmons proposal is helpful. Simmons proposed a base price of
$77,202 per month and also:
I.

Agreed to the support the recycling program with a surcharge on its

contract; and,
2.

Agreed to continue the prior County practice of increases based on CPI

adjustments and a fuel price surcharge that would go up or down based on fuel prices. (R
Vol. 1, pp. 13

if 20, 65; R Vol. 2, p. 242.) 1

Idaho County's brief accurately describes the substance of many hours of public meetings
wherein the Idaho County Commissioners heard Walco argue and try to explain how the Walco

1 Simmons proposed a base rate and only one material deviation from the pricing terms proposed by the
Commissioners: an additional per-ton charge for waste exceeding 4,500 tons per year. (R Vol. 2, p. 242 (Simmons
proposal agreeing "to perform collection of solid waste per Idaho Counties (sic) proposal specifications"); see also R
Vol. 2, pp. 220---32 (RFP with proposed contract labeled "proposal specifications").)
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contract was actually better for the County than the Simmons contract. Eventually, even Walco
had to concede that point:
COMMISSIONER BRANDT: Okay. I see we need to crunch a lot more numbers.
MR. HOLMAN: After all this Robert may still be lower, but I just wanted to make
sure all the numbers are considered before you get to an awarding process because
I don't want to know that we didn't let you know where he possibly might be
without us at least defending our side and saying where our number is. So he may
still come out lower after you're done crunching. I just didn't want it to be 77,000
as compared to 87,000 as a black and white number.
MR. MACGREGOR: I would say table it for a month -- I mean, for a week -- for a
week and crunch some of the numbers.
(R Vol. 5, p. 993 LL. 19-25, p. 994 LL. 1-7.) (Emphasis added.)
One might admire Walco for the aggressive approach they took in meeting the County's
RFP. However, aggression involves risk and it should surprise no one, not even Walco, that their
higher cost proposal that rejected established County policies would be understood to be inferior
to Simmons' proposal.
V. CONCLUSION
First, this appeal should be dismissed as against Simmons since Walco did not identify as
an issue on appeal that the case was dismissed against Simmons on the grounds of estoppel, nor
did Walco cite to the record or any authorizes that would show Judge Stegner to have committed
error in so holding. Judge Stegner clearly established estoppel as a separate and sufficient ground
for dismissal. This emerges from the language of his opinion and his careful use of the word "and"
at page 15 (R Vol. 8, p. 1834) ofhis opinion before going on to explain why Walco's claim against
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Simmons is stopped.

Waleo's failure to even attempt to show this to be error precludes

consideration of this issue on appeal. See, Bolognese, supra.
Secondly, the transcripts of the meetings from October 15, 2012, and onward disclose that
the Idaho County Commissioners fully engaged in giving both Walco and Simmons a full and fair
chance to win the public contract in discussions held in a public forum. The transcripts also show
that Waleo made a full-throated and detailed argument as to why their proposal was superior,
before eventually conceding, at least, that Simmons' base price was lower. This pattern supports
the argument made by Idaho County (and joined by Simmons) that nothing secret survived the
public disclosure.
Finally, even if some trade secret arguably may exist, it would be inequitable to impose
liability on Simmons for acquiring information only after Walco made it public. and Waleo should
be found estopped from doing so.
Therefore, the District Court's opinion on this matter should be affirmed.
DATED this 30th day of January, 2015.
RISLEY LAW QFFICE, PLLC
Attorney for )JefJndant-Respondent
Simmon;;~anitatio~eyvice, Inc.
,l
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